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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case is before the Court on appeal from the district court's decision revoking
Krystal Easley's probation and executing a reduced sentence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In August 2005, Defendant Krystal Easley consented to a police search of her
car and person that yielded two pipes and a container with methamphetamine residue.
(11/22/2005 PSI, p. 2.)

Easley later pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled

substance. (R, pp. 59-60.

1
)

The district court sentenced Easley to a unified term of

four years with two years fixed, but suspended sentence and ordered supervised
probation subject to conditions. (R, pp. 82-86.)
In September 2007,

Easley admitted to

probation

violations,

including

absconding and not staying in touch with her probation officer. (R, p. 111.) At her
disposition hearing the following month, the district court granted the state's motion to
revoke Easley's probation, and re-imposed her original sentence; but the court again
ordered probation subject to conditions. (R, p. 115.)

1
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In July 2010, Easley admitted to further probation violations. (R., pp. 178-80.

2

)

This time, her admissions included possessing and using methamphetamine and
violating a no contact order.

(R., p. 180.) At her disposition hearing in September

2010, the district court granted the state's (second) motion to revoke probation, and
again re-imposed her original sentence.

(R., p. 197.)

This time, the court retained

jurisdiction for Easley to participate in a rider program. (R., pp. 197-98.) At the rider
review hearing in February 2010, the district court suspended the sentence and once
again ordered probation subject to conditions. (R., pp. 205-07.)
In April 2011, the state filed a third motion to revoke probation. (R., pp. 214-16.)
In November 2011, Easley admitted the violations (R., p. 233), which included failing to
provide drug tests, actively avoiding supervision by her probation officer, and
absconding. (R., pp. 215-16.) The district court reinstated probation and ordered her to
undergo a substance abuse assessment and a mental health examination.

(R., pp.

234,236.)
Sometime around October 2011, Easley again violated probation by providing
false information to lawenforcement. (R., p. 242.) In December 2011, Easley admitted
the violation. (R., p. 258.) At the disposition hearing in January 2012, the district court
revoked probation for the fourth time, and executed the sentence.

(R., pp. 268-69.)

Easley timely appealed. (R., p. 462. 3 )

2 Around this time, the district court began using a second case number (#10-7265) in
addition to that for her original offense (#05-7711). (R., p. 183.)
31n March 2012, Easley's appeals on the two state court cases were consolidated. (R.,
p.476.)

2

In April 2012, transcripts of the following hearings were lodged in the court
record:

10/17/05 Entry of Guilty Plea Hearing, 11/28/05 Sentencing Hearing, and

1/31/12 Disposition Hearing. (R., p. 478.) In July 2012, Easley's counsel filed a motion
to augment the record to include transcripts from the following hearings:

9/17/07

Admit/Deny Hearing, 10/29/07 Disposition Hearing, 2/22/11 Rider Review Hearing,
11/15/11 Admit/Deny Hearing, and 12/5/11 Admit/Deny Hearing. (7/27/12 Appellant's
Mot. to Augment.) This Court granted the motion in part and denied in part, adding to
the record only transcripts of the 11/15/11 Admit/Deny Hearing, and the 12/5/11
Admit/Deny Hearing. 4 (8/13/12 Order.)

The State did not object to the admission of these transcripts, but objected to
transcripts of the earlier probation violation hearings because Easley's notice of appeal
as to those probation revocations was untimely. (See 7/31/12 Objection in Part.)
4
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ISSUES
Easley states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Ms. Easley due process and
equal protection when it denied her Motion to Augment with the
requested transcripts?

2.

Does the Fifth Judicial District's practice, which allows the
prosecutor to prevent a district court from considering the
placement of a defendant into mental health court violate Idaho's
separation of powers doctrine?

3.

Does the Fifth Judicial District's practice, which allows the
prosecutor to prevent a district court from considering a defendant
as a candidate for mental health court violate the constitutional
requirement that all courts of the same class have uniform judicial
powers, procedures, and practices?

4.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms.
Easley's probation?

5.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to further
reduce Ms. Easley's sentences sua sponte upon revoking
probation?

(Appellant's brief, p. 5.)

The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Easley failed to show that transcripts she sought to add to the appellate
record were relevant or necessary for adequate, effective review, and thus failed
to demonstrate a due process or equal protection violation by this Court in
denying her request?

2.

Has Easley failed to establish that the Fifth Judicial District's practice of giving
prosecutors veto power over participation in mental health court violates Idaho's
Constitution?

3.

Has Easley failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion by
revoking Easley's probation upon her admission to repeated probation violations,
or by reducing Easley's sentence less than she wanted?

4

ARGUMENT

I.
Easley Has Failed To Show That Transcripts She Sought To Add To The Appellate
Record Were Relevant Or Necessary For Adequate, Effective Review, And Thus Fails
To Demonstrate A Due Process Or Equal Protection Violation By This Court In Denying
Her Request
A.

Introduction
Easley requested and was provided transcripts from hearings pertaining to her

underlying offense and conviction, as well as her most recent admissions to probation
violations. (8/13/12 Order.) However, this Court denied her request for transcripts of a
rider review hearing and an earlier probation violation hearing. (Id.) Easley argues that
the Court's denial of these transcripts violates her right to due process and equal
protection. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-20.) Because Easley misapplies the relevant law,
her arguments fail.
B.

Standard Of Review
Where, as here, a defendant appeals the denial of a motion to augment the

record, the Idaho Court of Appeals will evaluate and rule on it as a renewed motion.
State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, _, 288 P.3d 835, 837 (Ct. App. 2012). A motion to
augment is appropriately renewed where new evidence or the parties' briefing has
clarified or expanded the issues on appeal, thus supporting addition of the requested
documents. lQ.

Here, as in Morgan, there does not appear to be sufficient basis to

warrant a renewed motion to augment.

Id.

But, assuming the motion was properly

raised, see id., the state now responds on the merits of Easley's claim.

5

C.

Denial Of The Motion to Augment Does Not Violate Easley's Due Process Right
Because The Requested Documents Are Not Relevant To The Issues On
Appeal
Easley argues that denial of her motion to augment the record violates her right

to due process.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 7-17.)

In support, Easley offers a broad

discussion of Idaho case law, but fails to clearly identify the applicable law.

Under

Idaho law, the appellate court must consider whether Easley has been denied "a record
on appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding
the proceedings below." Morgan, 153 Idaho at _,288 P.3d at 838 (citations omitted).
Although the record on appeal is not confined to those facts arising between sentencing
and the probation revocation appealed, id. (citing State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28,
218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009)), it need not include "all proceedings in the trial court up
to and including sentencing." Id. (emphasis original). Rather, the appellate court will
consider those elements of the trial court record relevant to the probation revocation
issues and that are properly part of the appellate record.

lsl

In Morgan, similar to this case, the defendant had more than one probation
violation admission hearing, and more than one disposition hearing.

19..

at 837. On

appeal, Morgan moved to augment the record to include hearing transcripts regarding
his initial probation violation, but was denied.

lsl The Morgan court ultimately hung its

hat on the defendant's untimely objection to the clerk's record under Idaho Appellate
Rule 29(a).

lsl However, the substantive rule articulated in Morgan still applies: that

the appellate court need only consider those elements of the record below that were
germane to the trial court's probation revocation decision.

lsl To prevail on Easley's

first issue, she must show that the transcripts from proceedings relating to her first

6

probation violation were germane to the trial court's revocation decision challenged in
this appeal. 5 Easley fails to do so.
Notably, the Morgan court said, "[t]his Court will not assume the omitted
transcripts would support the district court's revocation order since they were not before
the district court in the [final] probation violation proceedings, and the district court gave
no indication that it based its revocation decision upon anything that occurred during
those prior hearings."

Id. at 838.

As in that case, the district court here gave no

indication that its decision revoking Easley's probation and imposing sentence was
based on information provided in prior hearings but not for her final disposition hearing.
(1/31/12 Disposition Tr.) The transcript reflects instead that the court revoked Easley's
probation based on information provided for the final hearing that meticulously
chronicled

Easley's

history

of probation

violations

and

unresponsiveness

to

rehabilitative programming. (1/31/12 Disp. Tr., pp. 31-38.)
Easley has failed to show that transcripts from her prior hearings would be at all
relevant for review of the district court's decision revoking Easley's probation and
imposing sentence. Absent any relevance, Easley has not shown that exclusion of the
transcripts in the appellate record hinders her counsel's ability to provide effective
assistance.

(See Appellant's brief, pp. 18-19.)

Accordingly, Easley's due process

arguments fail.

As discussed in the State's objection to Easley's initial motion to augment, this Court
lacks jurisdiction to hear a challenge to the first probation violation. (See 7/31/12
Objection in Part.)
5
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D.

Easley Has Failed To Show The Requested Transcripts Are Needed For
Adequate And Effective Review, So As To Support An Equal Protection
Challenge
Easley also argues that the court's denial of her motion to augment the record

violates her right to equal protection under the law.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 7-17.)

Easley cites a number of Idaho statutes and rules that she argues require transcripts to
be provided for indigent defendants at county expense. (See Appellant's brief, p. 7.)
According to Easley, the court's denial of her motion amounted to disparate treatment
based on her indigence. (Id. at 8.) However, the statutes and cases cited by Easley do
not support her argument.
The U.S. Supreme Court has said that "[d]estitute defendants must be afforded
as adequate appel/ate review as defendants who have money enough to buy
transcripts." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19, 76 S.Ct. 585, 591 (1956). The Griffin
court specifically provided that its holding did not require a state to pay for transcripts
whenever a defendant requests it; rather, "adequate and effective appellate review"
may be provided to indigent defendants through other means.

lsL

at 20, 76 S.Ct. at

591.
In her initial motion to augment, Easley failed to demonstrate that transcripts of
initial probation violation proceedings are needed to insure adequate and effective
appellate review. (Appellant's Mot. to Augment.) Thus, this Court appropriately denied
her motion.

(8/14/12 Order.)

On her renewed request, Easley again fails to

demonstrate that the requested transcripts are necessary. Even if she did demonstrate
that those records were in some way relevant to her appeal, Easley has not established

8

that a transcription of proceedings at county expense is the only way to satisfy her right
to equal protection. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 20, 76 S.Ct. at 591.
Easley contends that, "if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, the
transcript must be created at county expense." (Appellant's brief, p. 7.) One statutory
provision cited by Easley provides that the court reporter shall be paid at county
expense where the accused lacks financial means to pay. I.C. § 1-1105(2). However,
that provision applies to transcripts of proceedings ordered by the court following a
party's written request. I.C. § 1-1105(1). This does not apply because this Court did
not order but instead denied the transcripts requested. The second provision cited by
Easley requires county reimbursement for the cost of transcription "necessarily
incurred" in representing an indigent defendant.

I.C. § 19-863(a).

As already

discussed, Easley has made no showing whatsoever that the requested transcripts are
necessary.
Easley also argues that production of transcripts by an indigent defendant is
required by Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2.

But this rule concerns requests made to the

district court for purposes of a criminal trial.
Criminal Rules, apply to Easley's appeal.

The Idaho Appellate Rules, not the
No Idaho Appellate Rule requires the

appellate court to provide a county-paid transcript upon request by an indigent
defendant.
For these reasons, the court should deny Easley's first argument renewing her
Motion to Augment.
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II.

Easley Has Failed To Show That The Fifth judicial District's Practice Of Giving
Prosecutors Veto Power Over Participation In Mental Health Court Violated Idaho's
Constitution

A.

Introduction
Easley raises two constitutional challenges to the prosecutor's veto of her

placement in mental health court. (Appellant's brief, pp. 21-37.) According to Easley,
this veto power, held by the prosecutor in Idaho's Fifth Judicial District, violates both the
separation of powers doctrine, and the requirement of uniformity in judicial powers and
practices.

(ld.)

Because she cannot establish a constitutional violation, Easley's

arguments fail.
B.

Legal Standard
Easley's constitutional challenges are legal issues that the appellate court

reviews de novo. State v. Olson, 138 Idaho 438, 440,64 P.3d 967, 969 (2003). Easley
acknowledges she did not object to the prosecutor's veto power. (Appellant's brief, p.
22.) Where a party asserts an unobjected-to fundamental error, she must show that
the error (1) violates an unwaived constitutional right, (2) that it plainly exists, (3) and
that it was not harmless. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010).
As to the second prong, an error is plain where "existing authorities have
unequivocally resolved the issue in the appellant's favor." State v. Hadden, 152 Idaho
371, 375,271 P.3d 1227, 1231 (Ct. App. 2012). As demonstrated below, Idaho law
does not support that there was a constitutional violation. Accordingly, she does not
satisfy any of the required elements for fundamental error.

10

C.

Easley Has Failed To Show That The Prosecutorial Veto Power Permitted Under
The Idaho Drug Court and Mental Health Court Act Violates The Separation Of
Powers Doctrine
In challenging the prosecutor's veto power, Easley does not address the

enabling statute, the Idaho Drug Court and Mental Health Court Act. 6 I.C. §§ 19-5601,
et seq.

Importantly, the Fifth Judicial District's practice of requiring prosecutorial

approval for a defendant to participate in drug or mental health court, is expressly
permitted by the Act. See I.C. § 19-5606. To understand this and the Act's impact
here, some background is warranted.
The Act established Idaho's drug and mental health courts as "innovative
diversion efforts," State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 739 n.1, 170 P.3d 881, 882 (2007),
to alleviate jail and prison overcrowding, and address mental health and substanceabuse needs of offenders, among other goals.

I.C. § 19-5602.

The Act requires

creation of a "coordinating committee" involving judges and court administrators,
prosecutors and public defenders, treatment providers, law enforcement, legislators,
mental health professionals, and a representative of the governor's office, among
others.

I.C. § 19-5606.

This collaborative committee is responsible for developing

guidelines regarding issues including eligibility, treatment, and evaluation. 1.9..: Under
the Act, "[n]o person has a right to be admitted into a mental health court" or drug court.
I.C. §§ 19-5609(1), 5604(1).
Where a statute's language is unambiguous, the legislature's clearly expressed
intent is given effect. State v. Dickerson, 142 Idaho 514, 517,129 P.3d 1263,1266 (Ct.

law was first enacted by the Idaho legislature in 2001 as the Idaho Drug Court Act,
and amended in 2005 as the Idaho Drug Court and Mental Health Court Act. I.C. §§
19-5601, et seq.
6The

11

App. 2006) (citations omitted).

If ambiguous, the court will try to determine the

legislative intent, and will construe the statute given its language, the reasonableness of
proposed interpretations, and policy considerations.

.lit By its language, the Act here

provides for development of eligibility guidelines by a committee including members of
all branches of government. I.C. § 19-5606. Nothing in the Act's language precludes a
guideline wherein participation is determined by the county prosecutor. The question is
whether the prosecutorial veto power, as permitted by the Act, violates the separation of
powers doctrine.
Article V, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution provides that "[t]he legislature shall
have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which
rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government ....

J!

Idaho Const.

art. v, sect. 13. Whether the Act violates this separation of powers provision is one of
first impression in Idaho.

However, other jurisdictions' treatments of similar statutes

offer guidance.
The Oregon Court of Appeals addressed the issue with respect to drug court in
State v. Graves, 58 Or.App. 286, 648 P.2d 866 (Ct. App. 1982). There, the court noted
that the decision to prosecute a defendant is well-established .
868.

.lit at 290, 648 P.2d at

Reasoning that "the power to decide whether to divert a defendant for drug

treatment is no more intrusive on the judicial branch than the power to decide whether
to take any action against a defendant at all," the Graves court found no separation of
powers violation .

.lit at 290-91, 648 P.2d at 868-69.

The Washington Court of Appeals also addressed the issue as to drug court in
State v. Diluzio, 121 Wash.App. 822, 90 P.3d 1141 (Ct. App. 2004). In that case, the

12

court noted that the purpose of drug court - to reduce recidivism and substance abuse
among nonviolent abusing offenders
initial eligibility determination."

~

7

-

"is best met when the prosecutor makes the

at 828, 90 P.3d at 1144.

This is true, the court

found, because "the prosecutor is more involved with the defendant to best assess his
or her eligibility."

~

The "practice of allowing the prosecutor to make the initial

determinations of drug court eligibility [is not] an unconstitutional delegation of judicial
power to the prosecutor."

~

at 828, 90 P.3 at 1144. Thus, the Diluzio court held that

statute did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

~

The court in Diluzio cited similar holdings by the louisiana Supreme Court,
State v. Taylor, 769 SO.2d 535, 537 (la. 2000), and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals, Woodward v. Morrissey, 991 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Ok.App. 1999).

~

at 828-29,

90 P.3d at 1144-45.
The courts' analyses in Graves and Diluzio apply here. Mental health court, like
drug court, involves the collaborative efforts of all branches of state government, as well
as community organizations and professional providers. See I.C. §§ 19-5602, et seq.
As recognized by the court in Diluzio, the prosecutor is in the best position to assess a
defendant's eligibility. Diluzio, at 828, 90 P.3d at 1144.
At Easley's disposition hearing, her counsel expressed that mental health
evaluators recommended Easley's participation in mental health court (1/31/12 Tr., p.
38, ls. 18-23). Although a mental health evaluator can certainly identify if someone
has a mental health need, this is only one consideration in the eligibility calculus. Other
factors include the defendant's likely success in mental health court, and optimal use of

7

Diluzio, 121 Wash.App. at 825,90 P.3d at 1143.
13

the state's limited resources.

See I.C. § 19-5606 (coordinating committee shall

"recommend funding priorities and decisions per judicial district").
The prosecutor acknowledged that Easley "may have or does have some mental
health issues," but recommended that the issues could be addressed outside of mental
health court. (1/31/12 Tr., p. 37, L. 23 - p. 38, L. 1. Also, the prosecutor noted that
Easley had "been less than up front with law enforcement," and had "absconded
probation." (1/31/12 Tr., p. 38, Ls. 2-4.) These observations addressed other relevant
aspects of the decision to pursue mental health court.
The discretion afforded the prosecutor in determining Easley's mental health
court eligibility parallels the wide discretion given prosecutors in deciding what charge(s)
to file.

See State v. Hernandez, 136 Idaho 8, 12, 27 P.3d 417, 421 (Ct. App. 2001)

(citation omitted). Just as the facts in a case may legitimately invoke more than one
criminal statute, id., the facts may also support multiple options for addressing the
mental health issues of a defendant. The legislature acknowledged the variability of
these facts in mandating the formation of a mental health coordinating committee to
decide eligibility, among other decisions. I.C. § 19-5606.
Other than the veto of Easley's participation in mental health court, the
prosecutor did not hinder the district court's ability to sentence Easley.

Indeed, the

district court reduced Easley's sentence to two and a half years fixed, four and a half
indeterminate (1/31/12 Tr., p. 50, Ls. 5-8), from the prosecution's recommendation of

14

three years fixed with four years indeterminate 8 (1/31/12 Tr., p. 38, Ls. 7-9). Also, the
court recommended a therapeutic community placement or other "mental health
modalities that may be available" in the penitentiary. (1/31/12 Tr., p. 49, L. 25 - p. 50,
L. 3.)

These options suggest that mental health court is not the sole means of

addressing defendants' mental health concerns; the availability of alternatives is yet
another consideration for a defendant's candidacy into mental health court.
Ultimately, Easley has failed to show that the requirement of prosecutorial
approval for her participation in mental health court is an impermissible encroachment
on judicial power. Rather, the record demonstrates that the prosecutor's exercise of
veto power was squarely within its valid legislatively delegated authority.

Given the

Act's objectives, the multiple considerations for participation in mental health court, and
the district court's otherwise unencumbered sentencing power, there was no separation
of powers violation here.
D.

Easley Has Failed To Demonstrate A Violation Of Uniform Judicial Powers,
Procedures, And Practices
Easley also argues that the prosecutor's veto power violates the constitutional

requirement that all courts of the same class have uniform powers, procedures, and
practices under Article V, Section 26 of the Idaho Constitution. (Appellant's brief, pp.
35-37.) That section provides that:
All laws relating to court shall be general and of uniform operation
throughout the state, and the organized judicial powers, proceedings, and
practices of all the courts of the same class or grade, so far as regulated

This was the prosecutor's recommendation for the 2010 case, to run concurrently with
a two year fixed, two year indeterminate sentence for Easley's 2005 case. (1/31/12 Tr.,
p. 38, Ls. 7-8.)
8

15

by law, and the force and effect of the proceedings, judgments, and
decrees of such courts, severally, shall be uniform.
Idaho Const., art. V, § 26. According to Easley, this provision was violated because the
veto power afforded prosecutors in the Fifth Judicial District, over eligibility into mental
health court, is inconsistent with mental health court practices in other districts.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 35-36 (citing 1/31/12 Tr., p. 40, Ls. 17-22).)
This argument relies on the premise that the prosecutor's veto power is a court
procedure or practice.

As argued in the preceding section, the requirement of

prosecutorial approval for participation in mental health court is not a judicial function.
Instead, it is a function validly conferred to the prosecutor under the language of the
Act. See I.C. 19-5606. Because Easley cannot show that the prosecutorial veto power
is a judicial function, she also fails to show lack of uniformity in judicial powers,
procedures, or practices.

I".
Easley Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Revoking Easley's Probation Upon Her Admission To Repeated Probation Violations,
Or By Reducing Easley's Sentence Less Than She Wanted
A.

Introduction And Legal Standard
Easley's remaining arguments assert that the district court abused its discretion

in revoking her probation and imposing sentence.

On review of a district court's

decision revoking probation, the appellate court considers (1) whether the defendant
violated probation, and (2) whether probation should be revoked or continued. State v.
Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009). The appellate court will defer to
the district court's credibility determinations, and will not disrupt the district court's
decision revoking probation absent showing that it abused its discretion. Id. Easley
16

concedes that she violated probation. (Appellant's brief, p. 38.) Thus the question is
whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her probation.
As to sentencing, a trial court's sentence that is within statutory limits must also
be undisturbed absent showing that it clearly abused its discretion.

State v. Windom,

150 Idaho 873, 875, 253 P.3d 310, 312 (2011) (citation omitted). To carry her burden,
an appellant must show that her sentence is excessive "under any reasonable view of
the facts," considering the objectives of criminal punishment: protection of society,
deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution or punishment. Windom, 150 Idaho at 876,
253 P.3d at 313.

In reviewing an excessive sentence claim, the appellate court

independently reviews the record, examining the nature of the offense, and the
offender's character. State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132,267 P.3d 709, 719 (2011)
(citation omitted). Where reasonable minds could differ as to whether a sentence is
excessive, the appellate court will not disturb it. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264
P.3d 935,941 (2011) (citation omitted).
In determining whether the district court abused its discretion - as to a probation
revocation or in sentencing - the appellate court considers (1) whether the trial court
understood that the issue was discretionary; (2) whether the trial court acted within its
discretionary scope and under applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the trial court
exercised reason. Miller, 151 Idaho at 834, 264 P.3d at 941 (citation omitted). Here,
Easley challenges only the final consideration, whether the district court exercised
reason.
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B.

Easley Has Not Met Her Burden Of Showing That Her Probation Revocation
Was An Abuse Of Discretion, Or That Her Sentence Was Excessive Under Any
Reasonable View Of The Facts
Given the facts, Easley does not come close to showing that the district court

abused its discretion.

As to her probation revocation, Easley's history of repeated

probation violations more than supports revocation. (R., pp. 111, 178-80, 233, 242.)
After no fewer than four motions to revoke probation, to which Easley admitted
violations, it is plain that the goal of rehabilitation was not being satisfied. See State v.
Leach, 135 Idaho 525,529,20 P.3d 709,713 (Ct. App. 2001). There is simply no basis
to disturb the district court's decision revoking probation.
As to sentencing, the district court reduced Easley's sentence to two and a half
years fixed from the prosecutor's recommendation of three years fixed (to run
concurrent with term of two years fixed in other case). (1/31/12 Tr., p. 38, Ls. 4-9; p.
50, Ls. 5-8.) This reduced sentence, in light of Easley's repeated probation violations
was certainly reasonable - even generous.

In arguing her sentence is excessive,

Easley notes only that she suffers from mental health problems, and that she has family
support.

As discussed above, there may be therapeutic programs available in the

penitentiary system to address her mental health concerns. (See 1/31/12 Tr., pp. 5950.) In light of the record, Easley has not satisfied her burden of showing the district
court's order should be disturbed under any reasonable view of the facts.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the state respectfully requests that this court deny
Easley's appeal.
DATED this 31st day of January 2013.
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